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In the Suprem.e Court of the
State of Utah
I

I

STATE TAX COMMISSIO·N OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,

vs.

CASE
NO. 7245

F. P. LINFORD, VOYLE B. BARBER
and RAYMOND PETERSON,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
The ,Utah State Tax Commission, plaintiff in this action, appeals from a judgment of the District Court of Utah
County sustaining defendants' demurrer to its complaint.
Plaintiff will hereinafter be referred to as appellant and
the defendants as respondents.
We agree that appellant's brief substantially sets forth
appellant's complaint, the form of bond or undertaking
signed by respondents, respondents' demurrer to the complaint and that the trial court sustained respondents" demurrer upon the theory that the State Tax Cnmmission
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had no authority to require or accept the type of written
contract upon which this suit is predicated.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Appellant in its brief states that it believes that this
case can be settled by answeri~g the following questions:
1. Does the complaint, as stated, fail to state a
cause of action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what
authority appellant accepted the written undertaking
upon which this suit is predicated?
2. Does the appellant, State Tax Commission,
have authority to require the type of written undertaking upon which this suit is predicated?
We believe that this matter can be further simplified
and that the issue can be determined by answering question 2.. We feel that if question 2 is resolved against appellant, there is no need to consider question 1.
Appellant in its brief urges two reasons why the district courts ruling should be reversed: First because the
undertaking sued upon is a common law obligation andrespOndents are liable upon the undertaking or bond signed
by them independent of statute. Secondly that the appellant has complied with the provisions of the laws of Utah
which authorize it _to accept security.
The first proposition was not raised or discussed before -the trial court, and as we believe the second point
raised-by appellant-is _the crux of this whole matter, we
prefer to direct our remarks to what appellant has designated in its brief as point 2.
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ARGUMENT
Point 1

We submit that a proper conclusion can be reached
in this case by answering the following question: Is the
undertaking accepted by appellant, and upon which the
complaint is founded, the kind of security the legislature
intended that the Tax Commission should require when it
determines that a retail vendor may fail to remit to the
State Tax Commission money collected by the vendor for
the State. To answer this question requires an interpretation of a part of Section 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1943. We quote the pertinent part:
"The state tax commission, whenever it deems it
necessary to insure compliance with the provisions of
this act, may require any person subject to the tax
imposed hereunder to deposit with it such security as
the state tax commission may determine. The same
may be sold by the state tax commission at public sale
if it becomes necessary so to do in order to recover
any tax, interest, or penalty due. Notice of such sale
may be served upon the person who deposited such securities personally or by mail; if by mail, notice sent
to the last known address as the same appears in the
records of the state tax commission shall be sufficient
for the purposes of this requirement. Upon any such
sale the surplus, if any, above the amounts due under
this act, shall be returned to the person who deposited
the security.''
The undertaking or bond, whatever it may be termed,
upon which the complaint is founded is clearly not security
that can be sold. If appellant asserts to the .contrary, why
has it not complied with the statute and proceed to do so?
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The section's provisions for notice to persons depositing said collateral, sale thereof, and_ disposition of any surplus, would indicate a pledge of collateral with conditional
power of sale to insure performance, and not a suretyship
or indemnity contract.
This court in the case of E. C. Olsen Company vs. State
Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 Pacific Second 324,
says:
"The Tax: Commission is created by statute and
has only such powers as the statute confers upon it.
Such powers must be exercised in accordance with the
statute."
In that case Mr. Justice Wolfe said:
"Where there is an ambiguity in the statute as to
whether the latter does or does not cover a particular
matter, a practical construction of the statute shown
to have been the accepted construction of the agency
charged with administering the matters in question
under the statute will be one factor which the court
may take into consideration as persuasive as to the
meaning of the statute. Especially is this true where
the agency, as in this case, is one on whom the Legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical work-Ing out of the statute and where praGtical application
of the_statute presents the agency with unique opportunities and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
inaccuracies or improvements in the statute. But such
factor -is only one among others persuasive on the
court when it is .engaged in the interpretation _of the
__ _:_: .statute- and may be given much 9r little weight .in the
-- total· consideration of the question . depending on cir• cumstances ·but never against the· plain meaning of the
statute.''
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To like effect is Utah Concrete Products Corporation
vs. State Tax Commission in 101 Utah 513, 125 Pacific
Second 408, in which the Court said:
"Defendant maintains that long compliance with
an administrative ruling lends strength to the presumption of the regulation's validity, city State Board
of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 P.
59; In the Matter of the Estate of John Cowan, 98 Ultah
393, 99 P. 2d 605; United States v. Missouri P. R. Co.,
278 !U. S. 269, 49 S. Ct. 133, 73 L. Ed. 322~ 323. This
is true. However, the interpretation placed on the
language of the statute by the Tax Commission must
not do violence to its apparent meaning~ The construction placed here by the defendant Tax Commission on
the Act misinterprets the meaning and intent of the
-Legislature. It cannot be termed a "practical" construction. Governmental agencies cannot deprive the
courts of their judicial functions nor can the agencies
extend the operation of the statute by administrative
regulations. Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State
Tax Commission, supra; P. H. Mallen Co. v. Department of Finance, 372 lll. 598, 25 N. E .. 2d 43; Dun &
Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 11
N. E. 2d 728; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Henneford,
D. C., 15 F. Supp. 302.
And in Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission,
107 Utah 24, 151 Pacific Second 467, in interpreting a ruling of the Commission the Court said:
"An administrative interpretation out of harmony
and contrary to the express provisions of a statute cannot be given weight. To do so would it:t effect. amend
the statute. Construction may not be substituted "for
legislation. United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278
U. S. 269, 49 S. Ct. 133, 73 L. Ed. 322.
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"In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev. 297 U.S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397,
400, 80 L. Ed. 528, the court held that an administrative regulation which was contrary to the statutory
provision was a nullity. In so holding, the court said:
'The power of an administrative officer or
board to administer a federal statute and to
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is
not the power to make law * * * * but the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the
statute. A regulation which does not do this,
but operates to create a rule out of harmony
with the statute, is a mere nullity (Citing cases) And not only must a regulation, in order
to be valid, be consistent with the statute, but
it must be reasonable. (citing cases) The original regulation as applied to a situation like
that under review is both inconsistent with
the statute and unreasonable."'
The latest case decided by this Court that we have been
able to find is that of the New Park Mining Company, et al.,
v. State Tax Commission, 196 Pacific Second, 485, not yet
reported in Utah Reports, follows. the rule stated in the
cases cited above.
We have no quarrel with appellant's argument that the
Tax Commission has the power to sue and be sued in its
own name, and that that power was given to enable it to
enforce payment of taxes. The Commission is still a creature.of the Legislature, with powers limited to those granted it.- by act of that Legislature. The grant of power to
sue::~nd be sued would not appear to be a grant of power
generally to legislate, or to exceed those substantive powers granted by the Legislature to the Commission.
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The Commission in its brief cites numerous cases defining the term "security," and with these we take no is·
sue. However, it will be noted that the facts out of which
the question arises in these cases as to what is "security"
caused the courts to give the definition in each particular
case. In no case cited by appellant can be found a definition holding that the type of undertaking herein sued upon
is defined as a "security."
We believe that Section 80-15-5 was enacted in the interest of the State of Utah and its people and to insure remittance of the tax to the State by the vendors of merchandise. Appellant seems to adopt a contrary point of
view and argues that the .law was enacted for the benefit
of vendors who are in precarious financial circumstances
and that appellant in the interest of such vendors may determine the type of bond that is acceptable, as well as
who shall sign the undertaking. We confidently assert that
to permit such practice would result in serious losses to
the State.
Section 80-15-5 is definite and certain as to the duties
of appellant, and to permit appellant to place the interpretation upon it that they seek to do would be to authorize
them to legislate. No reference in the section is made to
a bond or an undertaking. Had the Legislature intended
that the appellant should have authority to accept a bond
or undertaking, they would have said so; there is precedent for so doing. In Section 80-10-4, Utah Code Annota•
ted, 1943, the Legislature specifically authorizes county assessors to accept. bonds. Section 80-25-49, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, authorizes the county to accept a bond :Jn
lieu of the payment of the taxes at the time they are as..
sessed. Section 80-14-26 specifically grants the tax· com-
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mission the right to require a taxpayer to furnish a bond
where undue hardship would be imposed upon the taxpayer
who is delinquent in his payment of taxes.
Counsel places reliance upon a regulation which counsel says appellant published effective January 1, 1944, and
which has been in continuous effect since that time, and
then quotes the section. As we view the issues, it makes
little or no difference as to whether the appellant did or
did not promulgate such an order. Surely the passage of
the regulation which is in direct contravention of the plain
mandate of the law cannot be given effect. To give effect
to it would be to permit the appellant to legislate, and that,
this Court has said they may not do.
In view of the statute quoted above and of the authorities cited ,we take the position that the appellant has deliberately violated the plain mandate of the law and that
the complaint is defective and· fails to state a cause of action.
Point 2
Appellant's next contention, denominated by it as point1, ·that the undertaking herein sued upon is good in any
event as a common law obligation, is next considered.
This argument may appear plausible at first glance.
However, examination of authorities cited by appellant to
sustain the theory that the instant undertaking is good in
any event as a common law obligation will show that, in
all cases wherein a bond, invalid because not complying
with ·statutory provisions, has been upheld, there has in
the, first -instance been. either a statutory provision for a
suretyship or indemnity bond, or power to require such
has been inherent, and the bond in question has simply not
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complied with the statutory provisions. Annotation, LRA
1917B, p. 990ff.
The Kansas City case of State ex. rei. Hendrick, Co.
At\,~. vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 114 Pacific
Second 812, cited in appellant's brief, p. 9, is not in point
for the reason that the bond therein involved was required
by a court. It is axiomatic that courts have wide discretion
in imposing conditions upon those before it, and the Kansas court so recognized in the cited case (p. 816 of report,
headnote 7-9). The Utah State Tax Commission is not
a court, and its discretionary power is closely hedged by
statutory restrictions and grants of power. E. C. Olsen
Co. vs. State Tax Commission, supra. To hold the pond in
question in this case valid as a cornmon law obligation would
be to give the Tax Commission by indirection powers which,
we submit, they do not have by legislative grant, and would
circumvent the rule against unauthorized legislative power in an administrative agency.
The case of Central -Banking & Security Co. vs U. S.
F. G. et al, 80 South Eastern 121, cited by appellant (Appellant's brief, p. 7) to sustain its argument for the validity
of the undertaking herein sued upon, is also distinguishable.
That case involves the enforceability of an administrator's
bond taken by the clerk of the court without statutory authority. That is, that case also involves the powers of a
court in the first instance to require bonds, and the defect
there cited was that the statutory procedure was not followed.
As cited earlier in this brief, in the E. C. Olsen Co.
case, "The Tax Commission is created by_ statute- and· has
only such powers as the statute confers upon it. Such powers must be exercised in accordance with the statute."
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(boldface added). It is respondents' position that, the commission being merely a creature of limited powers, those
powers cannot be expanded by the commission " pulling itself up by its own bootstraps." It cannot achieve by indirection what it is not permitted to do directly. It has no
"inherent" powers and must exercise the powers it has "in
accordance with the statute." A defectively executed bond
may be upheld as a common law obligation; a bond accepted when no statutory authority at all exists therefore, supposedly running to an agency of limited powers, of which
accepting such an obligation is not one, should be declared
void.
In the case of Territory ex. rei. Thacker, Co. Atty. vs.
Woodring, 82 Pacific 572, 574, the Oklahoma court has this
to say:
"But it is contended that, if the bond is invalid
as a statutory bond, it is good as a common law bond.
This contention is clearly untenable. A statutory bond,
which is void for want of authority to execute it, cannot be enforced as a common law obligation. (cases
cited)."
That case involved the taking of a bail bond by the
clerk of the court, when there was no authority to do so.
The court held that there was no inherent power in the
clerk of the court to take such a bond, and absent a statute, he had no such power. Appellant earnestly urges that
the undertaking is valid under the statute. .If it ·is, as respondent contends, void for want of authority in the Commission to accept it, then it cannot be held valid as a comlJ.l.Qn.l~w obligation.
It is respectfully submitted that the acceptance of such
an undertaking as herein sued upon is against public policy.
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As urged elsewhere in this brief, regardless of the recom-

mendations of appellant to the Legislature, that body saw
fit, when acting upon said recommendations, to enact a law
specifically providing that when appellant determined that
a retail vendor was in a precarious financial condition, then
the vendor be required to deposit with appellant· readily
saleable collateral sufficient to cover the amount of the
sales tax collected. The Legislature contemplated a summary and effective means of getting tax money collected
into the State treasury. It did NOT contemplate tying up
large sums of public money in the form of collected sales
taxes in suretyship bonds, many of which might require
protracted litigation before payment can be realized, and
many of which, even after litigation, niight prove worthless. If this be so, how then, can the appellant urge the
validity of such an undertaking as a common law obligation, even if we were to admit that appellant's authorities
therefor were in point?
In the case of Territory ex. r.el. Thacker, Co. Atty., vs.
Woodring et al, supra, at page 574, the Oklahoma court,
after holding that a statutory bond, which was void for
want of authority to execute it, could not be enforced as a
common-law obligation, had this to say:
''It follows that the bond taken in this case by the
deputy clerk of the district court is void, and therefore the court property sustained the demurrer to the
petition, on the ground that it did not state facts suf. .
ficient to constitute a cause of action."
It is respondents' position that the undertaking herem
sued upon cannot stand as a common law obligation; that
it must derive its force and effect from a statutory proviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sion; that there is no statutory provision therefor; and that
because of this absence of statutory authority, the complaint is demurrable on the ground of insufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action.
CONCLUSIONS
We submit that Section 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is not ambiguous or uncertain; and that it was
enacted to protect the interests of the State and not the
interest of vendors who might be in precarious financial
circumstances. We further submit that the interpretation
placed upon the above section by appellant- is out of harmony and does violence to the plain wording of the statute.
Appellant urges the Court to approve the procedure
followed by it because of hardship to vendors. The adoption of such a theory by the Court, we believe, would be
tantamount to a grant of power to appellant to legislate and
a declaration that appellant, having fallen into error, could
perpetuate its error_ as law.
There was and is a total lack of authority by appellant to accept the undertaking which was the foundation
for the complaint sued upon. There being no authority to
accept the undertaking, the instrument is void under statutory provisions, as well as upon the theory of a common
law obligation. There being no authority to accept the undertaking, the trial Court was required to sustain the respondents' demurrer.
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We respectfully submit that the judgment of the District .Court was correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DALLAS H. YOUNG, SR.,
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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